Running several sub-optimal algorithms and choosing the optimal one is a common procedure in computer science, most notably in the design of approximation algorithms. This paper deals with one significant flaw of this technique in environments where the inputs are provided by rational agents: such protocols are not necessarily incentive compatible even when the underlying algorithms are. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions for such best-outcome protocols to be incentive compatible in a general model for agents with one-dimensional private data. We show how our techniques apply in several settings.
INTRODUCTION
In the presence of selfish agents with private information, systems should guarantee that the desired outcomes are obtained in equilibrium. In many settings, determining the optimal outcome is computationally hard, even without incentive problems, and approximation algorithms or other ad-hoc heuristics should be developed. One common technique for constructing such algorithms runs several algorithms and chooses the result that is achieved by the best algorithm. In the design of approximation algorithms, this popular technique is usually used for balancing the worstcase performance of several extreme scenarios. See, e.g., the recent algorithms in [3, 1] . Another prominent use of this technique is in the design of randomized algorithms, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. where algorithms are run repeatedly for boosting their success probability, see, e.g., [8] . Unfortunately, even when the underlying algorithms obtain their results in a truthful dominant-strategy equilibrium, there is no guarantee that their maximum will remain truthful. The goal of this paper is to devise a general characterization of algorithms whose maximum can be implemented in dominant strategies.
We present two characterization results. The first is a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability in dominant strategies of the maximum over a set of algorithms. This result defines the crossing points of every two algorithms and shows that the maximum over algorithms is dominant-strategy implementable if and only if the alternatives chosen near these crossing points change monotonically. This characterization describes how the decisions that are made by two algorithms should interact such that their maximum is incentive compatible. We also devise a safety condition for a single algorithm, saying that maximum over algorithms for which this condition is met must be dominant-strategy implementable. This property says that at every point that is a potential crossing point with another algorithm, the algorithm should choose the alternatives in a "safe" manner. We demonstrate our techniques in two auction settings.
Single-parameter domains in mechanism design have been recently extensively studied in computer science. Examples include work on single-minded combinatorial auctions (e.g., [2] ) and auctions for digital goods (see [4] and the references within). The closest result in spirit to this paper is by [9] , who studied the monotonicity of the maximum of two algorithms for single-minded combinatorial auctions. A further discussion on similar operators was given by [5] .
THE MODEL
Consider a set of alternatives ALT = {a1, ..., am} and a set of n agents. Each agent has a privately known type θi ∈ [θ i , θi] (where θ i , θi ∈ R, θ i < θi), and a type-dependent valuation function vi(θi, a) for each alternative a ∈ ALT . In other words, agent i with type θi is willing to pay an amount of vi(θi, a) for alternative a to be chosen. We denote the set of all possible type profiles by
Let θ−i denote the type profile excluding θi. The utility of each agent is quasi-linear.
The social value that the social planner gains from each alternative depends on the types of the agents and is given by a social-value function g : Θ × ALT → R. Typically, the social planner aims to choose an alternative that maximizes the social value. We assume that for every alternative a, the function g(θ, a) is continuous with respect to all θi. The social value is a general concept, and it does not necessarily refer to the social welfare. Also, our general model does not restrict the space of alternatives to "losing" or "winning" alternatives.
A mechanism is composed of an allocation algorithm A : Θ → ALT and a payment rule p : Θ → R n (i.e., pi(b) denotes the payment to the agent i).
Given the above definitions, we can formally define the maximum over a set of algorithms. Since all our results hold for any tie breaking rule, we treat max{A1, ..., Ak} as a unique algorithm.
Definition 1. Given a set of algorithms A1, ..., Ak, let max{A1, ..., Ak} denote an algorithm that chooses alternatives that maximize the social value, that is, for every θ ∈ Θ, max{A1, ..., Ak}(θ) = Aj(θ) where j ∈ argmax i∈{1,...,k} g(Ai(θ), θ).
Dominant-Strategy Implementation:
Algorithm A is dominant-strategy implementable (or just implementable) if there exists a payment scheme p such that reporting the true type is the best declaration for each agent, regardless of the declarations of the other agents. That is, for every agent i with type θi, and every θ i and θ−i,
For characterizing the set of implementable algorithms, we will require a structural assumption on the preferences of the agents. This assumption is made, implicitly or explicitly, in almost every paper on mechanism design in single-parameter environments.
Definition 2. A valuation function vi : Θ × ALT → R is single crossing if there is an order i on the alternatives, such that for any two alternatives Aj i Al we have that for every θ ∈ Θ, ∂vi(θ, Aj) ∂θi > ∂vi(θ, Al) ∂θi and if neither Al i Aj nor Aj i Al (denoted by Aj ∼ Al) then vi(·, Aj) ≡ vi(·, Al) (i.e., the functions are identical).
Example 1. (Single-minded combinatorial auctions)
Consider an auction for 3 items x, y and z among 5 agents. Each agent is only interested in a single bundle. Assume that v1(xy) = 3, v2(xy) = 6, v3(yz) = 5 and v4(yz) = 7. We also know that Agent 5 is interested in the bundle z. There are 8 alternatives in this model: a1="1 wins", a2="3 wins", a3="2 wins", a4="4 wins", a5 = "5 wins", a6 = "1 and 5 win", a7="2 and 5 win", and also a0="no one wins". The horizontal lines and the 45 degree lines in Figure 1 depict the social value as a function of θ5 fixing the other values to the values mentioned above.
For single-crossing preferences, monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for dominant-strategy implementation. See, e.g., [7] for the formal details. 
IMPLEMENTING THE MAXIMUM
We will first present a technical notation for the neighborhood of a profile of types, and then define crossing points between algorithms.
Definition 4. Given an agent i and a type profile θ ∈ Θ.
• The set of type profiles L ⊂ Θ is called a left i-neighborhood of θ, if there exists δ > 0 such that
• The set of type profiles R ⊂ Θ is called a right ineighborhood of θ, if there exists δ > 0 such that
Definition 5. Two algorithms A and B are crossing at θ ∈ Θ with respect to agent i if there exists a left i-neighborhood L and a right i-neighborhood R to θ such that at least one of the following holds for every θ ∈ L and every θ ∈ R:
For example, consider the combinatorial auction setting described in Example 1 and in Figure 1 . The thick curve and the dashed thick curve in the figure describe the choices made by two algorithms denoted, respectively, by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The algorithms are crossing at, for example, (θ * i , θ−i) and (θ * * i , θ−i). For θ * i , Algorithm 1 gains higher social value on its right neighborhood, and Algorithm 2 does so on the left neighborhood (where i=5).
In monotone crossing points, the algorithm that maximizes the social value in their left neighborhood chooses an alternative with lower priority than the social-value maximizing algorithm in the right neighborhood.
Definition 6. Consider two algorithms A and B that are crossing with respect to agent i at θ ∈ Θ. If there exist left and right i-neighborhoods with the same properties as in Definition 5 such that for every θ ∈ L and θ ∈ R, we have that B(θ ) i A(θ ) (when Eq. 1,2 hold) or A(θ ) i B(θ ) (when Eq. 3,4 hold) then θ is a monotone crossing point of A and B with respect to agent i.
Two algorithms A, B are monotonically crossing, if for every agent i, all the crossing points of A and B with respect to agent i are monotone. This property turns out to be equivalent to the implementability of the maximum. 
MAX-SAFE ALGORITHMS
We now describe a property of algorithms guaranteeing that taking a maximum over algorithms with such property results in a monotone algorithm.
Definition 7. Algorithm A is MAX-safe, if for every set of algorithms {A1, ..., Ak} we have that if MAX{A1, ..., Ak} is implementable then MAX{A1, ..., Ak, A} is also implementable.
Again, we will be interested in points that may potentially turn into crossing points between algorithms.
Definition 8. A profile of types θ ∈ Θ is called a potential crossing point for algorithm A with respect to agent i if there exist a left i-neighborhood L, a right i-neighborhood R for θ, and two alternatives l, r ∈ ALT , such that for every two points θ ∈ L, θ ∈ R we have that either
Definition 9. Consider a potential crossing point θ for algorithm A with respect to agent i. θ is called non-monotone, if there exist left and right i-neighborhoods L and R with the same properties as in Definition 8, such that for every two type profiles θ ∈ L and θ ∈ R we have that either l i A(θ ) (if Eq. 5 holds) or A(θ ) i r (if Eq. 6 holds).
Algorithm A has monotone potential crossing points if, for every agent i, A does not possess non-monotone potential crossing points with respect to agent i. For example, Algorithm 1 in Fig. 1 has a non-monotone potential crossing point with respect to agent i at θ * * i .
Theorem 2. An algorithm is MAX-safe if and only if it is monotone and it has monotone potential crossing points.
APPLICATIONS

Auctions for Rectangular Bundles:
Consider the following problem: a seller wishes to sell properties on a 2-dimensional plane and agents have privately known values for different axis-parallel rectangles on this plane. The (NP-hard) objective of the seller is to allocate disjoint rectangles to agents such that the total sum of their values is maximized. [1] showed how a variant of the Shifting algorithm by [6] forms a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism that guarantees a O(log R) approximation to the social welfare, where R is an upper bound on the ratio of any two edges of rectangles. In [1] , each agent is interested in a single rectangle only. We show that the Shifting mechanism is incentive compatible in a more general setting where each agent may interested in several bundles with different values. The Shifting algorithm is structured as a maximum of several atomic algorithms, hence our techniques can be applied. Definition 10. An agent i has an OR-linear valuation if there exist bundles S1, ..., Sn i and coefficients α1, ..., αn i such that for any bundle T the agent's value for receiving T is vi(T ) = maxI j∈I αjθi, where the maximum is taken over all the index sets I such that for every i = j ∈ I, Si ⊆ T and Si ∩ Sj = ∅. Proposition 2. There exists a mechanism with a polynomial running time that achieves an O(log R) approximation to the optimum and is incentive compatible for agents with OR-linear valuations.
Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions:
We now show by example how the MAX-safe property easily derives the bitonicity property introduced in [9] .
In Figure 1 , each agent divides the alternatives to those where he wins (here, with a 45 degree slope) or loses (with a zero slope). We saw earlier that if the algorithm switches from a winning alternative to a winning one with a lower social value, this may cause a non-monotone potential crossing point (e.g., moving from a7 to a5 by Algorithm 1 at θ * * i ). On the other hand, moving upwards between winning alternatives (like Algorithm 2 moves from a6 to a7) cannot create non-monotone potential crossing points. Similarly, moving downwards between losing alternatives (like from a2 to a1) is safe, while moving upwards is not. It follows that an algorithm that moves downwards while the agent loses and upwards when the agent wins, will be MAX-safe. This is exactly the definition of bitonicity.
